| ABSTRACT
A novel distributed scheme that combines cooperative ARQ with the spectrum
leasing paradigm is proposed and analyzed. The strategy harnesses the
opportunistic gains of cooperative communications, while inherently providing
a spectrum-rewarding incentive for the otherwise non-cooperative relays to
assist the source's transmission. As in cooperative ARQ, the source might
decide to hand over the possible retransmission slots to nearby stations that
were able to decode the original transmission. In the proposed scheme,
however, in exchange for the cooperation, the relaying station is also awarded
an opportunity to exploit the retransmission slot for its own traffic.
Arbitration of relays' retransmissions is performed via an auction mechanism,
with the source, the competing relays and the transmission slot acting as the
auctioneer, the bidders and the bidding article, respectively. Auction theory
(more generally, the theory of Bayesian games) is applied to analyze the
scheme performance. It is noted that the setting here can be alternatively
seen as a practical framework for implementation of property-rights cognitive
radio networks. Numerical results and analysis show that the proposed scheme
enables an efficient dynamic resource allocation that provides relevant gains
(e.g., transmission reliability) for both the original source (primary) and
the cooperating nodes (secondary users).
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